In class actions involving more than one defendant and at least one local defendant, two exceptions to jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) potentially come into play. The “home state” exception applies if two-thirds or more of the proposed class members and the “primary defendants” are citizens of the state where suit was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B). The “local controversy” exception applies if the same two-thirds threshold is satisfied, there is at least one local defendant “from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class” and “whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class,” and during the previous three years, “no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.” Id. § 1332(d)(4).  The terms “primary defendants,” “significant relief” and “significant basis” are not defined in the statute, and thus whether a particular defendant constitutes a “primary defendant” or satisfies the “significant basis” requirement have been the subject of extensive litigation.

The First Circuit recently addressed these issues, reviewing the law nationwide. It held that the “home state” exception did not apply because a nonlocal defendant was a “primary” defendant. However, the “local controversy” exception applied because the local defendant satisfied the “significant basis” requirement where essentially the same claims were alleged against all defendants. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever the case against the nonlocal defendant, with one judge dissenting from that ruling.

In Kress-Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Wal-Mart of Puerto Rico, Inc., — F.4th –, 2024 WL  4750774 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2024), the plaintiffs were smaller merchants who sued several big-box retailers, alleging that they failed to comply with the executive orders of the governor of Puerto Rico during the COVID-19 pandemic. The big-box retailers were permitted to remain open for supermarket and pharmacy operations but allegedly sold other “non-essential” goods in violation of the orders. The case was removed to federal court by Costco, the only non-local defendant. The federal district court denied a motion to remand and later granted summary judgment for the defendants.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged federal jurisdiction under both the “home state” and “local controversy” exceptions to CAFA. Addressing the “home state” exception, the First Circuit explained that in interpreting the term “primary defendant,” some courts have focused on whether a defendant is alleged to be directly liable to the proposed class as opposed to vicariously or secondarily liable. Other courts have focused on which defendants have the largest exposure. The First Circuit appeared to agree with the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which considers both of those factors, along with others. The First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Costco was not a “primary” defendant because its potential liability was smaller than others — approximately $65 million, in comparison to Wal-Mart’s potential liability of over $265 million. Costco was a “primary” defendant because it “could face direct liability to class members on the order of tens of millions of dollars,” The “home state” exception was therefore inapplicable because one “primary” defendant was nonlocal.

Addressing the “local controversy” exception, the First Circuit explained that most circuits have adopted the Third Circuit’s test, under which a “significant” defendant is one whose alleged conduct is “an important ground for the asserted claims in view of the alleged conduct of all the Defendants.”  The First Circuit explained that courts have disagreed over how to apply this test where the complaint alleges that local and nonlocal defendants engaged in essentially the same conduct. The Ninth Circuit found that the local controversy exception applies in that circumstance, while the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have required what the First Circuit described as “some sort of plus-factor in the allegations of a local defendant’s conduct (as compared to non-local defendants’ conduct) to count the local defendant’s conduct as a ‘significant basis’ of the plaintiffs’ claims.” The First Circuit concluded that a “plus factor” was not required and agreed with the Ninth Circuit that a local defendant can be “significant” if the complaint’s allegations do not differentiate between defendants, but it noted that a “holistic evaluation” is required and that “[w]e remain sensitive to Congress’s suggestion that the local controversy exception is a ‘narrow’ one.” On the facts of this case, the First Circuit held that Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., a local defendant, satisfied the “significant basis” requirement because “all the claims run against Wal-Mart, and all the plaintiffs in the putative class have claims against Wal-Mart.” The “local controversy” exception therefore applied, defeating federal jurisdiction.

The First Circuit panel was split in reviewing the district court’s denial of Costco’s motion to sever. The majority concluded that the claims against the various defendants were properly joined under Rule 20(a) because they arose out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” The majority found it sufficient for joinder purposes that all the claims arose out of the COVID-19 pandemic and the governor’s orders. Judge Hamilton (of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation) dissented on this issue. Looking by analogy to intellectual property cases, he would have held that severance was warranted because the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “acting independently and in competition with each other” engaged in similar conduct at the same time, but were not alleged to act in concert. Judge Hamilton would have found joinder improper, severed the claims against Costco and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in its favor.

This case is an example of how navigating the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction can be complicated and requires a detailed case-by-case analysis along with the law of the applicable circuit. The “home state” exception is a tougher climb for plaintiffs. The “local controversy” exception is construed more broadly in some circuits than others. If plaintiffs can avoid CAFA merely by alleging that multiple defendants engaged in the same conduct and one of them is local, that has the potential to create a significant gap in federal jurisdiction. In such cases, severance might be a strategy worth pursuing by nonlocal defendants if Judge Hamilton’s dissenting opinion gains traction in his home circuit or others.

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Photo of Wystan Ackerman Wystan Ackerman

I am a partner at the law firm of Robinson+Cole in Hartford, Connecticut, USA.  My contact information is on the contact page of my blog.  I really enjoy receiving questions, comments, suggestions and even criticism from readers.  So please e-mail me if you…

I am a partner at the law firm of Robinson+Cole in Hartford, Connecticut, USA.  My contact information is on the contact page of my blog.  I really enjoy receiving questions, comments, suggestions and even criticism from readers.  So please e-mail me if you have something to say.  For those looking for my detailed law firm bio, click here.  If you want a more light-hearted and hopefully more interesting summary, read on:

People often ask about my unusual first name, Wystan.  It’s pronounced WISS-ten.  It’s not Winston.  There is no “n” in the middle.  It comes from my father’s favorite poet, W.H. (Wystan Hugh) Auden.  I’ve grown to like the fact that because my name is unusual people tend to remember it better, even if they don’t pronounce it right (and there is no need for anyone to use my last name because I’m always the only Wystan).

I grew up in Deep River, Connecticut, a small town on the west side of the Connecticut River in the south central part of the state.  I’ve always had strong interests in history, politics and baseball.  My heroes growing up were Abraham Lincoln and Wade Boggs (at that time the third baseman for the Boston Red Sox).  I think it was my early fascination with Lincoln that drove me to practice law.  I went to high school at The Williams School in New London, Connecticut, where I edited the school newspaper, played baseball, and was primarily responsible for the installation of a flag pole near the school entrance (it seemed like every other school had one but until my class raised the money and bought one at my urging, Williams had no flag pole).  As a high school senior, my interest in history and politics led me to score high enough on a test of those subjects to be chosen as one of Connecticut’s two delegates to the U.S. Senate Youth Program, which further solidified my interest in law and government.  One of my mentors at Williams was of the view that there were far too many lawyers and I should find something more useful to do, but if I really had to be a lawyer there was always room for one more.  I eventually decided to be that “one more.”  I went on to Bowdoin College, where I wrote for the Bowdoin Orient and majored in government, but took a lot of math classes because I found college math interesting and challenging.  I then went to Columbia Law School, where I was lucky enough to be selected as one of the minions who spent their time fastidiously cite-checking and Blue booking hundred-plus-page articles in the Columbia Law Review.  I also interned in the chambers of then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor when she was a relatively new judge on the Second Circuit, my only connection to someone who now has one-ninth of the last word on what constitutes the law of our land.  I graduated from Columbia in 2001, then worked at Skadden Arps in Boston before returning to Connecticut and joining Robinson+Cole, one of the largest Connecticut-based law firms.  At the end of 2008, I was elected a partner at Robinson+Cole.

I’ve worked on class actions since the start of my career.  Being in the insurance capital of Hartford, we have a national insurance litigation practice and most of the class actions I’ve defended have been brought against insurance companies. I’ve also handled some involving products liability, managed care, health care, utilities, financial services, higher education and environmental issues.

My insurance class action practice usually takes me outside of Connecticut.  I’ve had the pleasure of working on cases in various federal and state courts and collaborating with great lawyers across the country.  While class actions are an increasingly large part of my practice, I don’t do exclusively class action work.  The rest of my practice involves litigating insurance coverage cases, often at the appellate level.  That also frequently takes me outside of Connecticut.  A highlight of my career thus far was working on Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, the U.S. Supreme Court’s first Class Action Fairness Act case.  I was Counsel of Record for Standard Fire on the cert petition, and had the pleasure of working with Ted Boutrous on the merits briefing and oral argument.

I started this blog because writing is one of my favorite things to do and I enjoy following developments in class action law, writing about them and engaging in discussion with others who have an in interest in this area.  It’s a welcome break from day-to-day practice, keeps me current, broadens my network and results in some new business.

When I’m not at work, you might find me running lines or watching a musical with my teenage daughter who hopes to be a Broadway star (or taking her to voice or dance lessons) or reading a good book.