One strategy some plaintiffs’ attorneys have used to try to avoid federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) is to voluntarily dismiss a case after it has been removed to federal court, and then re-file a new complaint in state court with amended allegations framed in a way that will bar federal jurisdiction.  For example, after a defendant’s notice of removal explains how the $5 million amount in controversy is satisfied for the proposed class, the plaintiff might attempt to voluntarily dismiss the case and then re-file a new complaint that withdraws certain causes of action, or narrows the time period for the proposed class or the manner in which the class is defined, in order to reduce the amount in controversy to below $5 million.  (Some defendants might welcome such a limitation if the state courts in the jurisdiction closely adhere to federal precedent on class certification.  This tactic is more commonly used in states where class action law differs markedly from federal law, or where the judicial climate is considered much more friendly to plaintiffs in a state court.)  This tactic also might be employed to try to fit a case into CAFA’s local controversy exception or home state exception. 

This issue was recently addressed in a case in which I represented the defendants.  In Thatcher v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., No. 11-1610, 2011 WL 5247892 (8th Cir. Nov. 4, 2011) (slip opinion available on the 8th Circuit website), the defendants had answered shortly before the plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal, and opposed the motion for voluntary dismissal. The district court allowed dismissal before taking up the issue of jurisdiction under CAFA.  The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.  The court wrote that:

[T]he district court failed to address Thatcher’s [i.e., the plaintiff’s] purpose in seeking to voluntarily dismiss. If the trial court had done so, it could have concluded that Thatcher was dismissing so he could return to the more favorable state forum. Thatcher’s expressed intent was to amend his complaint in order to avoid federal jurisdiction. . . . This reading of Thatcher’s purpose is supported by his failure to consider the effects of his actions on the putative class that he purportedly represents. In the original complaint, Thatcher included claims for unjust enrichment, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach of contract. In his motion to dismiss without prejudice, Thatcher set forth his intention to refile this matter in state court as a breach of contract claim only. Thatcher set forth no adequate reason why it would benefit the class to abandon these additional claims.

In addressing whether a district court should allow voluntary dismissal, we have repeatedly stated that it is inappropriate for a plaintiff to use voluntary dismissal as an avenue for seeking a more favorable forum. See, e.g., Cahalan v. Rohan, 423 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A party may not dismiss simply to … seek a more favorable forum.”). In the removal context, this rule coincides with other measures which “strike a balance between the plaintiff’s right to select a particular forum and the defendant’s right to remove the case to federal court.” Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 976 (8th Cir. 2011). For example, under the fraudulent-joinder exception, a plaintiff cannot defeat a defendant’s right of removal by “fraudulently joining a defendant who has no real connection with the controversy.” Id. (citation omit-ted). Likewise, under the St. Paul Mercury rule, in a diversity action a plaintiff may not merely amend his complaint after removal to claim damages below the jurisdictional amount and deprive the federal court of jurisdiction.   St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292, 294 (1938) ( “If the plaintiff could, no matter how bona fide his original claim in the state court, reduce the amount of his demand to defeat federal jurisdiction the defendant’s supposed statutory right of removal would be subject to the plaintiff’s caprice.”); see also Jones v. Mosher, 107 F. 561, 564 (8th Cir.1901) (“As the right to remove an action which falls within the jurisdiction of the federal courts is a substantial right, the federal courts … should be astute not to permit devices to become successful which are used for the very purpose of destroying that right.” (internal citation omitted)).

In this case, the determination of whether the motion to dismiss was an improper forum-shopping measure, by its very nature, called into question the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants exercised their right to removal under CAFA, and Thatcher appears to have sought dismissal merely to deprive the federal court of jurisdiction. As a result, determining whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction was at the crux of the issue of whether the motion to dismiss was being used for the improper purpose of seeking a more favorable forum. The district court erred in failing to take up the jurisdictional question, thereby necessitating remand of this matter. After the trial court determines whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, it can consider whether dismissal without prejudice is appropriate, taking into consideration whether the motion to dismiss is a forum-shopping measure. Alternatively, if the court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it should remand to the state court. 

Thatcher, 2011 WL 5247892, at *2-3.

A key practice pointer here is that if the defendant has not filed an answer or summary judgment motion, there will be no opportunity to object to a voluntary dismissal – in that circumstance, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a case as of right, without any need for court approval.  The only way to ensure that you preserve the right to oppose a voluntary dismissal is to file an answer or summary judgment motion together with your notice of removal.  Some defense counsel are concerned about not being able to file a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) after you have answered, but the same relief should be available on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

SPECIAL DISCLAIMER:  While I intend this blog to serve as an informational resource on insurance class actions and not advertising for my services as a lawyer, because I’m writing here about one of my own cases someone might think it is advertising.  Please understand that every case is different and the result achieved in the case described above may differ from the result in some other case, which may involve different facts, different applicable law or a different jurisdiction.  Past results do not guarantee future results, and you should always consult your own lawyer about your own case.

Print:
Email this postTweet this postLike this postShare this post on LinkedIn
Photo of Wystan Ackerman Wystan Ackerman

I am a partner at the law firm of Robinson+Cole in Hartford, Connecticut, USA.  My contact information is on the contact page of my blog.  I really enjoy receiving questions, comments, suggestions and even criticism from readers.  So please e-mail me if you…

I am a partner at the law firm of Robinson+Cole in Hartford, Connecticut, USA.  My contact information is on the contact page of my blog.  I really enjoy receiving questions, comments, suggestions and even criticism from readers.  So please e-mail me if you have something to say.  For those looking for my detailed law firm bio, click here.  If you want a more light-hearted and hopefully more interesting summary, read on:

People often ask about my unusual first name, Wystan.  It’s pronounced WISS-ten.  It’s not Winston.  There is no “n” in the middle.  It comes from my father’s favorite poet, W.H. (Wystan Hugh) Auden.  I’ve grown to like the fact that because my name is unusual people tend to remember it better, even if they don’t pronounce it right (and there is no need for anyone to use my last name because I’m always the only Wystan).

I grew up in Deep River, Connecticut, a small town on the west side of the Connecticut River in the south central part of the state.  I’ve always had strong interests in history, politics and baseball.  My heroes growing up were Abraham Lincoln and Wade Boggs (at that time the third baseman for the Boston Red Sox).  I think it was my early fascination with Lincoln that drove me to practice law.  I went to high school at The Williams School in New London, Connecticut, where I edited the school newspaper, played baseball, and was primarily responsible for the installation of a flag pole near the school entrance (it seemed like every other school had one but until my class raised the money and bought one at my urging, Williams had no flag pole).  As a high school senior, my interest in history and politics led me to score high enough on a test of those subjects to be chosen as one of Connecticut’s two delegates to the U.S. Senate Youth Program, which further solidified my interest in law and government.  One of my mentors at Williams was of the view that there were far too many lawyers and I should find something more useful to do, but if I really had to be a lawyer there was always room for one more.  I eventually decided to be that “one more.”  I went on to Bowdoin College, where I wrote for the Bowdoin Orient and majored in government, but took a lot of math classes because I found college math interesting and challenging.  I then went to Columbia Law School, where I was lucky enough to be selected as one of the minions who spent their time fastidiously cite-checking and Blue booking hundred-plus-page articles in the Columbia Law Review.  I also interned in the chambers of then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor when she was a relatively new judge on the Second Circuit, my only connection to someone who now has one-ninth of the last word on what constitutes the law of our land.  I graduated from Columbia in 2001, then worked at Skadden Arps in Boston before returning to Connecticut and joining Robinson+Cole, one of the largest Connecticut-based law firms.  At the end of 2008, I was elected a partner at Robinson+Cole.

I’ve worked on class actions since the start of my career.  Being in the insurance capital of Hartford, we have a national insurance litigation practice and most of the class actions I’ve defended have been brought against insurance companies. I’ve also handled some involving products liability, managed care, health care, utilities, financial services, higher education and environmental issues.

My insurance class action practice usually takes me outside of Connecticut.  I’ve had the pleasure of working on cases in various federal and state courts and collaborating with great lawyers across the country.  While class actions are an increasingly large part of my practice, I don’t do exclusively class action work.  The rest of my practice involves litigating insurance coverage cases, often at the appellate level.  That also frequently takes me outside of Connecticut.  A highlight of my career thus far was working on Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, the U.S. Supreme Court’s first Class Action Fairness Act case.  I was Counsel of Record for Standard Fire on the cert petition, and had the pleasure of working with Ted Boutrous on the merits briefing and oral argument.

I started this blog because writing is one of my favorite things to do and I enjoy following developments in class action law, writing about them and engaging in discussion with others who have an in interest in this area.  It’s a welcome break from day-to-day practice, keeps me current, broadens my network and results in some new business.

When I’m not at work, you might find me running lines or watching a musical with my teenage daughter who hopes to be a Broadway star (or taking her to voice or dance lessons) or reading a good book.

Read more about Wystan Ackerman
Show more Show less
Related Posts
Exceptions to Class Action Fairness Act Jurisdiction Addressed by First Circuit
November 18, 2024
Eleventh Circuit Provides New Guidance on Class Action Settlements
May 15, 2024
Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in Class Actions Addressed by Fourth Circuit
March 11, 2024